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NAVAL MODERNISATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
OVERVIEw
The conference was an extension of an ongoing research 
project conducted by the maritime security programme 
of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 
to explore the nature, causes and consequences of naval 
modernisation in Southeast Asia. Experts and practitioners 
from government, industry and academia discussed the 
drivers and enablers of naval modernisation: political, 
strategic and technological. The conference addressed 
such key questions as whether a naval arms race or arms 
dynamic is taking place, and whether contemporary naval 
developments are enhancing or undermining regional 
security. Constraints and challenges facing regional 
navies were also identified, as well as policy implications 
for Southeast Asia and the wider region.
OPENINg REMARkS
Ambassador Barry Desker 
Dean, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Ambassador Desker noted that Southeast Asia has made 
great strides in modernising its defence, including naval 
forces, over the last decade. The driving forces behind 
the military build-up are complex and varied. Among 
the important questions to be considered: is there a 
naval arms race in the region? What are the security 
implications of such a development? Is there a shared 
interest in cooperation and confidence building? What 
are the challenges in developing such a framework? 
Southeast Asia sits astride key choke points for shipping 
between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The region 
is economically and strategically important to the 
economies of Northeast Asia, the United States and the 
emerging maritime powers of Asia. Many countries see 
themselves as stakeholders as far as good order at sea is 
concerned. However, low intensity conflicts and political 
differences can affect behaviour and relationships. Most 
countries in the region have shared maritime boundaries. 
Misunderstandings could lead to potential conflict. The 
presence of major maritime players including the US, 
Japan, South Korea as well as the rising capabilities of 
India and China will have implications for Southeast Asia. 
Another area of concern is the increasing vulnerability of 
the region to emerging non-traditional threats including 
piracy, armed robbery, maritime terrorism, arms trafficking, 
illegal migration and environmental degradation. Navies 
should share the responsibility of maintaining the safety 
and security of sea lines of communication (SLOC) and to 
ensure the freedom of navigation. 
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SESSION I 
INTRODUCTION
NAVAl MODeRNISATION IN SOuTheAST ASIA: 
NATuRe, CAuSe, CONSequeNCeS AND 
PRObleMS Of ASSeSSMeNT
Geoffrey Till began by encapsulating the importance 
of studying navies. Navies tend to reflect broader 
developments in the international security architecture. 
Navies also shape the strategic environment. This is 
particularly applicable to a region as maritime dependent 
as the Asia Pacific, where the inter-relationship is felt 
between naval development and “soft” maritime security, 
such as counter-piracy and fisheries conservation. A 
second area of concern was the harder issue of evolving 
naval defence relationships. There was a tendency to focus 
on Northeast Asia, with the complex naval relationships of 
the US, China, South Korea and Japan, and increasingly the 
Indian Ocean. By comparison, Southeast Asia and its naval 
development has hardly featured in the analysis. It is hardly 
surprising that there has been such remarkable growth in 
the size, composition and operational aspirations of local 
fleets in Southeast Asia given the fact that countries have 
made great achievements in economic development over 
the last decade.
Over 70 per cent of the Asia-Pacific’s projected naval 
spending over the next 20 years will be on submarines, 
destroyers, frigates and amphibious warfare vessels. 
By contrast, spending on off-shore patrol vessels 
(OPVs), auxiliaries and patrol craft - all associated with 
Prof. Geoffrey Till
maintenance of good order at sea - is comparatively 
lower. This does not necessarily imply something to 
worry about. The preference of most naval planners is to 
preserve a “balanced” fleet that maximises their range of 
potential options in times of uncertainty. On one hand, 
navies retain a traditional deterrent role. At the same 
time they are also expected to maintain good order at 
sea though naval cooperation. Countries are aiming for 
more capable navies, not necessarily larger ones. The 
number of submarines is expected to increase markedly 
over the next couple of decades, not least among the 
smaller and lesser naval powers where submarines are 
seen as a force equaliser. The growth of the region’s 
interest in naval network operations may be even more 
significant. It is widely recognised that networks and 
connectivity of fleets is a particularly important aspect of 
naval modernisation. Navies in the region aspire to build 
up their national capacity, where this is possible, though 
indigenous production. 
Sea control is a preoccupation for all navies since it is a 
precondition for conduct of any operation at sea. In 
peacetime, navies will continue to collaborate to deal with 
transnational maritime security concerns such as piracy 
or maritime terrorism, which may be too much for an 
individual country to deal with autonomously. Moreover, 
the development of niche specialisation may also require 
a cooperative role from other navies to fill in the gaps to 
achieve certain common goals. 
There are three ways to analyse such an important but 
complex nature of navies: 
• First, study what the navies have actually said;
• Second, examine the composition of fleets navies and 
their operational priorities; and
• Third, observe the activities of navies, including training, 
exercises and deployments.
However, this is a difficult area of analysis and explains to 
a certain extent why maritime arms control has had such a 
spotty record. Moreover, it is difficult to compare priorities 
between countries.
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The DefeNCe ACquISITION PROCeSS: 
STAkehOlDeRS, MOTIVeS AND PROCeDuReS
Prof. Ron Matthews
Ron Matthews approached naval modernisation in the 
Asia-Pacific through the methodology of the “iron triangle”, 
inter-linking the armed forces, defence ministries and the 
defence industrial base. He underlined the importance of 
economic disparities among countries in the region, as 
well as differing cultural attributes and historical legacies, 
which may also offer a partial explanation to some of their 
procurement activities. 
Defence economics sees a positive relationship 
between increases in national income and rising military 
procurement. This is especially so if defence is perceived 
as a public good. However, the influences bearing on 
defence acquisition are complex. Countries with the 
ability to procure defence equipment tend to look at 
what is happening in their neighbourhood. Hence, there 
are common waves of procurement in combat aircraft, 
submarines, and frigates. It is not easy to infer from this 
that there is an arms race. The principal defence economics 
question is affordability. Can countries afford all that they 
want? Nearly every time the answer is “no”. This ambition 
versus capability gap is particularly prevalent in some of 
the countries of Southeast Asia. The relationship between 
defence expenditure and national income is termed as the 
“defence burden”. It is therefore important to look at the 
broader economy and its vitality for generating resources 
for progressive and sustained procurement of advanced 
defence equipment. 
One must also recognise the divergences in defence 
spending across the Asia-Pacific region. China is making 
significant progress in indigenous manufacturing and its 
shipbuilding industry was designated as a key priority. 
A problem in this area is the lack of any reliable date on 
budgets. There was also a region-wide move towards 
development of OPVs and disaster relief platforms. 
Some countries in the Asia-Pacific have a strong military 
technological and industrial skills base. There is a need 
to move towards closer calibration of defence policies 
and operational strategies in the region. The inaugural 
ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), 
held in October 2010, may herald a move towards greater 
collaboration in naval development, mirroring what has 
already occurred historically in the European sphere. 
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SESSION II 
COMMON THEMES
NAVAl MODeRNISATION IN The uS AND INDIA: 
CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS
Richard Bitzinger began his presentation by highlighting 
the difficulties in comparing the US and India given their 
very different requirements and objectives, and the vast 
capability gulf between the US Navy and other navies. 
Nonetheless, some common strands can be seen in their 
respective naval modernisation efforts. Both countries 
see a blue water navy as a core requirement. The US 
aims to maintain the capacity to patrol the oceans and 
project power globally. India has the ambition to achieve 
some kind of power projection capability for their navy, 
from a more modest base. Currently it is focusing on sea 
control and sea-based deterrence into the Indian Ocean. 
Both navies emphasise aircraft carriers. The US Navy 
predominates in the carrier battle group. It currently 
operates and is committed to maintaining 11 carriers. 
India also aspires to become a modernised, carrier-based 
navy and is planning to replace the ageing INS Viraat 
with two new carriers, including the former Soviet carrier 
Admiral Gorshkov. 
There are clear differences between the US and Indian’s 
modernisation efforts. The US navy emphasises cutting-
edge technology so as to maintain a qualitative advantage. 
It considers technology a force multiplier to compensate 
for a declining number of ships. The Indian Navy, on the 
other hand, aims to transform into a modern navy but 
may not be the technological equal of the UK Royal Navy 
or Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force. It has focused on 
certain capabilities, such as aircraft carriers. This is going 
to continue to guide Indian naval modernisation in the 
next few decades. However, the big question is whether 
Mr. Richard Bitzinger
they can afford or effectively implement such a step-
change in naval development. 
Enablers behind naval modernisation efforts include 
funds, technology and level of the industrial base. In 
the case of the US it outspends the rest of the world 
combined. Its ship-building industry is declining but it has 
over-capacitised naval production. In some senses, the US 
is the victim of its own technology, engaging in an arm 
race with itself. For India, the problem is that its defence 
industry is over-politicised, under-capitalised, and under-
technologised. Nevertheless, both countries are highly 
committed to maintaining a competent naval fleet and 
will certainly achieve some of their goals. 
NAVAl MODeRNISATION IN ChINA, JAPAN AND 
SOuTh kOReA: CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS
Ian Storey began his presentation by noting that an arms 
dynamic exists among the Northeast Asian countries. 
China, Japan, and South Korea are increasing outlays on 
their naval forces and acquiring major strategic assets 
such as large amphibious landing ships, aircraft carriers, 
destroyers, frigates and submarines. These developments 
are changing the military balance of power in Asia, and 
altering the strategic context of the most contested 
territorial disputes in the region, particularly the South 
China Sea.
It is not surprising that the locus of current and projected 
naval ship building capacity is in Northeast Asia. The 
economic powerhouses of China, Japan and South 
Korea are acquiring or expanding their blue water navy 
Dr. Ian Storey
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capabilities, providing them with the ability to project or 
sustain power in the world ocean spaces. Drivers of the 
naval modernisation efforts in Northeast Asia include 
re-capitalisation or replacement, reactive acquisitions, 
SLOC security, territorial and maritime boundary disputes, 
global stability, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief (HADR) operations, and in the case of China, great 
power aspiration. The enablers are large GDP size, national 
shipbuilding infrastructures and an advanced defence 
industry level.
It has been debated whether there is a naval arms race 
underway in Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia. Although 
a classic arms race is not happening in the sub-region, there 
is a discernible action and reaction to major procurements. 
It is often believed that countries are reacting to China’s 
naval build-up, but China is reacting to the naval capacity 
building of other countries as well. SLOC defence has 
been another important driver for naval modernisation 
in the region. Asia’s economic development is highly 
dependent on the free flow of maritime trade. Sea-based 
trade generated 87 per cent of East Asia’s GDP in 2005, up 
from 47 per cent in 1990. Northeast Asian countries rely 
heavily on SLOCs for energy security. All three countries 
have also articulated global stability and HADR missions 
in their strategic policy documents. 
China, Japan and South Korea all have territorial and 
maritime boundary disputes with each other. The 
modernisation of the PLA-N has strengthened China’s 
hand in the South China Sea, and rising nationalism puts 
pressure on all governments to resolve and uphold their 
territorial claims. Lastly, in the case of China, a factor 
which should not be discounted is the desire to purse a 
great power status. 
Ian Storey then compared and contrasted Northeast 
Asian countries’ naval modernisation efforts with those of 
Southeast Asia. Both sub-regions share similar features in 
terms of their motivations and consequences. First, SLOC 
security is a common priority. Second, territorial disputes 
are another important driver. Vietnam is particularly 
concerned by China’s growing assertiveness in the South 
China Sea. Third, Southeast Asian countries have the 
intention to share some global HADR responsibility. There 
is also an observable action and reaction acquisition 
dynamic in Southeast Asia, as seen in the widespread 
ambition to acquire submarines. But the sub-regional 
differences are also very clear. The defence spending 
of Southeast Asia is much smaller. In addition, most 
Southeast Asian countries lack the technical and industrial 
capacity, and rely primarily on foreign acquisitions and/or 
technology transfer.
TOwARDS A TheOReTICAl MODel fOR 
ANAlySINg weAPONS ACquISITIONS
Mr. Adrian Kuah
Adrian Kuah introduced a model for analysing the weapons 
acquisitions process and weapon systems. The Weapons 
Acquisitions Process (WAP) is the flow of decisions and 
actions by various actors geared towards the conception, 
development, and production of technically advanced 
weapons for ultimate use by the military. The analysis of 
the weapons acquisition process can be reduced to four 
basic questions: 
• What/how many to buy? 
• Who to buy from? 
• How to buy?
• When to buy? 
An alternative approach may be needed to explain the 
acquisition process in Southeast Asia. As the political 
and institutional context is different in each country, the 
weapons acquisition process is basically a two-actor game 
between the defence bureaucracy and the armed forces. 
With this method it is assumed that WAP is subjected to 
budget constraints and that a more advanced weapon 
system is preferred to a less advanced one.
Three potential outcomes flow from this. The first is the 
rational Actor Model, in which the defence bureaucracy 
and armed forces enjoy an equal relationship. It can be 
treated as a unitary rational actor and the outcome is 
driven solely by the imperatives of the military mission. It 
best fulfills military requirements, given the budget. The 
second is the dominant Armed Forces Model, where the 
armed forces dominate the bureaucracy in the acquisition 
process. Under this model, the armed forces have 
information superiority vis-à-vis technical information 
and military requirement. Consequently, armed forces 
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Mr. Mingi Hyun
engage in self-interested behaviour and extract private 
benefits from the weapons acquisition process. The third 
is the Dominant Bureaucracy Model, through which the 
defence bureaucracy engages in self-interested behaviour, 
seeking private benefit. In this case, the bureaucracy has 
veto power over military requests. Mr Kuah identified 
several limitations to his theory; for instance it does not 
explain how the budget is determined and assumes that 
the budget is “maxed out”.
COMMeNTARy 
Mingi Hyun argued that naval development need not 
necessary equate to naval modernisation. Sometimes 
it simply means transforming the navy to better meet 
requirements. Naval development proceeds ultimately 
from the formation of political requirements. It starts with 
conception, then proceeds to design and construction, 
then operation, and finally moving to the integration 
phase. A question central to naval development is 
whether transforming the navy meets requirements in 
the most effective, efficient and lasting fashion. 
The development of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) 
has some significance as a case study for Southeast Asian 
navies. The ROKN was transformed incrementally into an 
ocean-going navy, capable of deterring not only threats 
from North Korea but also of meeting potential regional 
contingencies, or providing blue water contributions 
to maritime coalitions beyond the region. Since former 
president Kim Young-Sam (1993-98) decided to approve 
construction of a blue water navy, the ROKN has not 
drastically increased its procurement budget. This fact 
is surprising, given its impressive capabilities. The ROKN 
was built on the foundation of serious commitment 
from political leaders, support from industry, long-term 
planning and R&D.
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SESSION III
SOUTHEAST ASIA CASE STUDIES I
NAVAl MODeRNISATION IN SOuTheAST ASIA: 
VIeTNAM
Nguyen Hung Son stressed from the outset that Vietnam 
was not joining an arm race in the region. Neither the 
political or military leadership have any such interest. 
However, the maritime space around Vietnam has 
historically been subject to foreign domination, and 
exploited illegally by the regional states. Since 1997, the 
Communist Party has sought to enhance the marine-
based economy and to transform Vietnam into a strong 
marine country. In 2007, a concrete strategy towards 
fulfilling these objectives by 2020 was adopted by Party 
Central Committee. The resolution set three broad 
strategic directions: 
• First, Vietnam should make a clear cut target to turn itself 
into a marine country, benefiting from the full potential 
of a marine-based economy. 
• Second, Vietnam will fully integrate the marine economy 
and national defence. 
• Third, it will conduct international cooperation toward 
that goal and firmly protect national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
By 2020, Vietnam’s marine based economy will account 
for 55 per cent of the national economy and 60 per cent 
of total exports. Since 2005, revenue from fisheries and 
offshore hyrocarbons has already accounted for more 
than half of GDP. Therefore, the nation naturally requires 
Mr. Nguyen Hung Son
a strong navy to protect its economic interests. The 2007 
resolution claims that defence policy to protect marine 
interests should combine political, legal-diplomatic, 
economic and military factors. The navy, air force and 
coast guard will effectively protect Vietnam’s fisheries, 
maritime resources and exploration activities. 
He then talked about how Vietnam views the security 
environment in the South China Sea. The 2009 Defence 
White Paper declared that Asia Pacific region had become 
increasingly important, posing several challenges to 
national defence. The South China Sea is one of the 
potential conflict hotpots identified. There are increasing 
cases of foreign ships ignoring the security zones of the 
country’s offshore oil exploration and installment and 
threatening safety and security. China’s recent reiteration 
of its “U-shaped’” claim line in the South China Sea has 
drawn concern. This is not only a claim, but China is 
increasingly enforcing it, creating a perception of threat 
among the Vietnamese public. With that perception in 
mind, Vietnam is clearly conducting a defence plan, in 
particularly, the modernisation of its navy. 
Based on the 2009 white paper, the naval force has 
responsibility for managing and controlling the maritime 
zones under Vietnam’s jurisdiction. It stated that naval 
forces were currently equipped only to perform search and 
rescue operations, and should be further strengthened 
with modern weapons and equipment to successfully 
undertake other duties to protect national sovereignty. 
The modernisation path that Vietnam is undertaking is 
for diversification both in terms of platforms and sources. 
Vietnam is also undertaking indigenisation of some 
naval production. 
It can be seen that Vietnam has a broad development 
strategy, and a strategic focus on the marine element. 
Because of that, Vietnam needs to have a strong 
defence and strong navy. Implementation of the navy’s 
modernisation plan is likely to be assisted by the high 
economic growth rates of recent years. There is little 
evidence that Vietnam’s naval expansion action is 
in reaction to a naval arm race in Southeast Asia. In 
conclusion, Vietnam’s military modernisation efforts 
should not alarm the regional countries.
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The MODeRNISATION Of The ROyAl 
MAlAySIAN NAVy: ChAlleNgeS, TReNDS  
AND IMPlICATIONS 
Nizam Basiron stated that the maritime realm is pivotal to 
Malaysia’s security and socio-economic well-being. The 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore and South China Sea are 
vital sea lanes of communication for trade and navigation. 
The task of securing the regions’ maritime realm rests with 
Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN). Like other Southeast Asian 
Navies the RMN typically performs traditional maritime 
security services as well as constabulary roles, particularly 
in resource protection. However, the RMN is increasingly 
being looked upon as a guarantor against non-
traditional maritime security threats such as crime at sea 
and terrorism. 
The RMN’s modernisation efforts have been driven by five 
factors: defence of national interests, external and regional 
factors, emerging issues, economic growth and the 2010 
National Defence Policy. Defence of national interests is a 
key driving force and related mainly to maritime territory, 
sovereignty, SLOC security, resource protection and 
environmental protection. Mr Nizam continued to note 
that external and regional factors, such as development of 
South China Sea disputes, naval modernisation efforts of 
other regional countries as well as the interests of external 
powers strongly influence Malaysia’s naval modernisation 
efforts. Emerging issues, such as piracy off the Horn of 
Africa and terrorism have also highlighted the importance 
of developing the navy. He added that Malaysia’s naval 
modernisation efforts have been strongly supported by 
economic growth. Finally, the 2010 National Defence 
Policy has a very big role to play. It defines Malaysia’s 
strategic maritime interests and areas, and envisages a 
navy that can protect and secure its maritime interests.
He concluded that the RMN’s modernisation path 
corresponds to the evolution of Malaysia’s maritime 
priorities, from coastal defence to EEZ and SLOC protection, 
Mr. Nizam Basiron
to the expansion of Malaysia’s maritime territory. Non-
traditional security threats prompted urgent operational 
requirement and the 2010 National Defence Policy would 
probably determine the future acquisition trend. 
PhIlIPPINe NAVAl MODeRNISATION, NATuRe, 
CAuSeS, CONSequeNCeS
Rommel Banlaoi started with an overview of the 
Philippine Navy (PN). In the 1950s, the Philippines was the 
only country in Southeast Asia with an operational navy 
composed of all naval and marine forces, combat vessels, 
auxiliary craft, naval aircraft, shore installations, and other 
supporting units. However, PN capabilities deteriorated 
rapidly in the 1970s. It is now facing the obsolescence 
of its floating assets and lacks adequate replacement 
parts to maintain existing ships, machinery, electronic 
communications, and fire control systems. 
He argued that Philippine naval modernisation programme 
is guided by the overall objectives of the 1995 Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Modernisation Programme, 
which intends to make the AFP a worthy player in any 
regional or international security arrangement. The PN’s 
modernisation efforts are also based on the premise that 
the PN shall be at the forefront of external defence and a 
bastion in the promotion of Philippine maritime security. 
Naval modernisation, therefore, may be viewed as the 
cornerstone of force modernisation. The PN identifies its 
three primary missions as: ensuring territorial integrity; 
protection of the EEZ; and contributions to regional 
peace and stability. These three primary missions are 
consistent with PN operational concepts that pursue 
naval modernisation with the main intent of establishing 
an inshore territorial defence navy. The PN also takes 
cognizance of its supporting role in international peace 
support operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
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He continued his presentation by discussing causes of 
Philippine naval modernisation. This may be considered 
part of the regional trend of maritime capacity building 
in the Asia Pacific region. Domestically, the main causes of 
Philippine naval modernisation are based on what the PN 
describes as the “Imperatives of Naval Defence”. It aims to 
address a series of interrelated maritime security concerns, 
such as territorial sovereignty, protection of the marine 
resources, maritime crimes, and maritime terrorism. For 
Southeast Asian countries, force modernisation is simply 
an attempt to upgrade their obsolete military assets so 
they can effectively protect their sovereignty and enhance 
military capacities to deal with non-traditional security 
challenges in the era of globalisation. 
He concluded that based on the type of naval assets 
that PN wants to procure under its naval modernisation 
programme and acquisition plans, the navy has no 
intention to create a navy with blue water capability. The 
main intention of naval modernisation in the Philippines 
is to create an inshore territorial defence force to secure 
archipelagic borders and protect territorial waters, 
particularly with the passing of 2009 Archipelagic 
Baselines Law. 
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SESSION IV 
SOUTHEAST ASIA CASE STUDIES II
RebAlANCINg INDONeSIA’S NAVAl fORCeS: 
TReNDS, PROSPeCTS AND ChAlleNgeS
Evan Laksmana noted that internal security threats have 
been predominant since 1945, resulting in an army-
centric military. However, in recent years, the rise of non-
traditional threats and security sector reforms have driven 
a wider defence transformation. 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence recently laid out a new 
ideal defence posture, and has also outlined a Minimum 
Essential Force (MEF), defined as “a minimum and 
essential standard of standing forces for the TNI critical 
and fundamental to address actual threats”. One of the 
guiding principles of the MEF, flashpoint-based scenario 
planning, underlines a shift in focus from a Java-centric 
defence towards the defence of potential flashpoints, 
with army and naval resources being filtered to the 
other islands. This is reflected in the increase from five 
to 11 primary naval bases, with most of the new bases 
situated in eastern Indonesia. In the period 1997-2010, 
naval manpower remained stable at 20 per cent of overall 
TNI personnel, while weapons platforms have remained 
largely unchanged. The majority of platforms are patrol 
ships and amphibious craft, reflecting the TNI’s long-
standing preoccupation with internal security threats, 
although this is expected to change in the future.
Naval development priorities in the coming years are: 
patrol and transport ships to replace ageing ships, 
safeguard borders, enhance logistical capabilities and 
support HADR; revitalisation of the domestic defence 
industry; development of “transformational bridge” 
technology; and the decommissioning of ageing ships. 
The navy currently has a standing order for eight corvettes, 
two submarines, three LSTs and four patrol craft. By 2029, 
the navy aims to have a striking force of 110 vessels, a 
patrolling force of 66 vessels and a supporting force of 98 
vessels, divided into four fleets. These ideal developments 
may be difficult to realise due to budgetary constraints, 
as the navy has seen declining spending in recent years.
Naval re-balancing in Indonesia has been enabled 
and driven by changes at the political, strategic and 
institutional levels. At the political level, some of the 
key enablers are: military reforms leading to increasing 
professionalisation of the navy, the militarisation of 
marine management in response to UNCLOS taking 
effect, and the rotation of the TNI Commander position 
between the service chiefs. At the strategic level, change 
has been driven by the rise of both traditional and non-
traditional maritime security threats, and the resultant 
military-police rivalry as the two lobby for budget share. 
Finally, at the institutional level, the drivers of change 
have been the decline of the domestic defence industry 
and ageing ships, as well as increases in the number of 
naval officers in the TNI leadership, and in the number of 
foreign-educated naval officers.
Finally, Laksmana raised the constraints and challenges 
facing the navy. Political problems include bureaucratic 
politics and turf wars with the police and other agencies, 
a lack of leadership and vision, budgetary inflexibility 
and parliamentary meddling. On the institutional side, 
challenges included platform diversification leading to 
a lack of interoperability, and dependence on external 
suppliers for combat ships and patrol boats. Finally, 
operational constraints included the lack of defence 
resource management, and the weakness of the civilian 
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Kiatiyut Tiansuwan began by explaining the role of the 
Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and Coast Guard in maritime issues. 
Even though Thailand has various maritime agencies 
in charge of marine and coastal resources, these agencies 
look to the RTN to assist them in their functions, resulting 
in many competing demands on the RTN’s resources. 
The RTN itself frames its priorities as the maintenance 
of territorial integrity; protection and conservation of 
marine assets, whether man-made or natural, maintenance 
of coastal peace and order, and the protection of 
marine transportation. 
Kiatiyut Tiansuwan enumerated the sources of conflict 
and threat perception of the RTN, namely: insurgency, 
natural disasters, territorial disputes, maritime terrorism, 
transnational crime and piracy, environmental destruction 
and illegal seaborne immigration. Mapping these onto a 
threat spectrum of likelihood against impact, he noted 
that insurgency and natural disasters were both high-
likelihood and high-impact. Transnational crime and 
piracy as well as illegal seaborne immigration are high-
likelihood but low-impact, yet media and public opinion 
has forced the RTN to react to them. On the opposite end 
of the spectrum, territorial disputes were unlikely in the 
immediate future, but high in potential impact. The RTN is 
thus faced with the challenge of balancing these multiple 
threats, and is presently engaged in counter-insurgency, 
HADR, countering drug smugglers, piracy and illegal 
immigration, while having to prepare for counterterrorism 
and limited warfare.
RTN modernisation has been driven by the evolution of 
its operational concepts and area of operations (AO) over 
three distinct phases: Cold War, Post-Cold War (1990s) 
and 21st century. During the Cold War, Thailand’s security 
environment was dominated by traditional threats and 
the strategic concepts of realism and balance of power 
prevailed, resulting in RTN taking a defensive posture 
and limiting its AO to coastal waters. Today, Thailand’s 
security environment presents both traditional and non-
traditional threats, resulting in RTN’s expanding its AO 
to the littoral straits as part of an operational concept of 
proactive defence, and its transformation from a coastal 
navy into an offshore navy.
The RTN has come a long way since the Cold War period, 
where it had only World War II legacy vessels and small patrol 
boats. In the 1990s, RTN purchased frigates from China, 
secondhand frigates from the US, and commissioned an 
aircraft carrier and Harriers from Spain, enabling it to deal 
with traditional threats. The emergence of non-traditional 
threats created demand for indigenously-built OPVs and 
Singaporean Landing Platform Docks (LPD), and has 
resulted in the aircraft carrier assisting in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief operations. RTN is now 
considering the purchase of submarines, re-establishing 
the submarine capabilities that Thailand had before the 
Second World War. Kiatiyut Tiansuwan concluded by 
raising the possibility of the RTN’s aircraft carrier taking 
part in future regional maritime cooperation efforts such as 
joint exercises. 
SeekINg bAlANCe: fORCe PROJeCTION, 
CONfIDeNCe-buIlDINg AND The RePublIC Of 
SINgAPORe NAVy
Mr. Collin Koh
Collin Koh presented part of his doctoral research, on how 
the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) can reconcile the 
build-up of force projection capabilities with confidence-
building measures. He began by examining small coastal 
states as a distinct breed from major maritime nations, 
characterised by a primary maritime area of concern up to 
the EEZ, mission scope of territorial defence and policing, 
resource constraints leading to naval force flexibility, 
and a tendency to rely on cooperation and international 
law to safeguard their maritime interests. He cited 
Scandinavian navies as a case study, elaborating on their 
transition from defensive postures during the Cold War 
era aimed at preventing amphibious landings towards 
more external orientations post-Cold War as their primary 
area of concern expanded to the boundaries of their 
EEZs. Accordingly, their force structure modernisation 
has focused on increasing force-projection capabilities by 
acquiring larger ships with extended sea ranges. 
Koh drew a broad parallel between the RSN and the 
Scandinavian navies in terms of force modernisation, 
but noted differences such as Singapore’s geostrategic 
circumstances and lack of strategic depth. With a wide 
coastline to defend, and economic dependence on the 
sea, the further the RSN can project its force offshore, the 
better it can protect its shore. 
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Moving on to a discussion of Singapore’s naval policy, Koh 
noted this involved an element of academic guesswork 
as the RSN does not produce white papers. However, the 
RSN has been increasingly vocal since the 1990s in the 
form of public statements by successive Chiefs of Navy. 
These statements have been consistent in affirming Total 
Defence as the overarching national security philosophy, 
based on the twin-pillars of deterrence and diplomacy, 
and in emphasising the need for RSN to become a more 
balanced navy with a full spectrum of capabilities. The 
RSN faces the challenges of resource constraints, and 
a shortage of manpower due to Singapore’s falling 
fertility rate, and has been leveraging technology to 
overcome these. 
Koh then traced RSN’s modernisation across three stages: 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the 1980s, the RSN focused 
on sea-denial and comprised mainly patrol ships with 
limited anti-air, anti-submarine and mine countermeasure 
capabilities. The 1990s saw the acquisition of the 
three aforementioned capabilities, and the significant 
purchases of corvettes and submarines, while the 2000s 
saw the acquisition of LPDs, frigates, and more advanced 
submarines, reflecting the RSN’s focus on expanding its 
force-projection capabilities. Koh noted that the purchase 
of LPDs had raised eyebrows, but argued that these did 
not fit the definition of destabilising naval armaments. 
Koh highlighted that Singapore had not acquired large 
ships such as cruisers or destroyers, and noted an absence 
of logistics support vessels for sustained force projection. 
In terms of diplomacy, the RSN has displayed peaceful 
behaviour in operations in politically sensitive areas 
such as Pedra Branca. Furthermore, the RSN has been 
cumulatively increasing its participation in naval 
cooperation activities from none in the 1980s to 23 in 
the 1990s, and 46 in the 2000s. These activities include 
coordinated patrols, and are indicative of the RSN’s efforts 
to project a confidence-building naval posture.
Koh concluded that the RSN faces an increasingly complex 
maritime geostrategic environment and constant 
change driven by demography, economics, geopolitics 
and technology. Because of resource constraints and 
demographic challenge, the RSN will have to leverage 
technology further to expand its capabilities, utilising 
force multipliers such as unmanned technologies, network 
C4I and more sophisticated submarines. Future combat 
platforms may be fewer in number but larger in size, and 
incorporate modularisation, increased endurance, and 
high levels of automation. Finally, the RSN will need to 
balance its acquisition of force projection capabilities with 
a corresponding increase in cooperative activities. 
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SESSION V
NAVAL MODERNISATION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
VIewS fROM INDuSTRy
Walter Doran began by challenging the audience to 
think about naval modernisation from the perspective of 
defence contractors. He sketched out various reasons for 
naval modernisation, including possible confrontations, 
asymmetric threats, ballistic missile defence and 
humanitarian relief. He noted that modernisation is 
not a new concept, and that it is natural for countries 
to modernise as they become more affluent and review 
their security environments. Modernisation is a global 
phenomenon, and the US defence industry is exploring 
markets overseas, in the face of flat or declining spending 
from the US Department of Defense.
Doran then discussed the various ways in which navies 
can modernise: through acquisition of new platforms, 
upgrading of legacy platforms, or the purchase of 
second-hand platforms from other navies. He focused 
on the first two, describing their “pros” and “cons”. 
Upgrading legacy platforms has the advantage of 
being usually cheaper and quicker, but disadvantages 
include compatibility issues with integrating disparate 
technologies, the retention of the limitations of the 
older hulls or platforms, and the lack of logistics and 
training support. 
In acquiring new platforms, countries have the 
advantages of being able to customise the platforms to 
fit their maritime strategy, use current technologies, and 
gain in prestige. On the other hand, the disadvantages 
include expense, cost creep, delays in delivery, and the 
risk of introducing technology that adversely impacts the 
capability of the platform. Doran cited the new Zumwalt-
class destroyers as an example: after many cost overruns 
Adm. Walter F Doran
and delays, the final order was for three ships, which 
would integrate 11 different new technologies at once. 
Nevertheless these three ships will serve as test-beds for 
the new technologies, which could then be replicated 
throughout other naval platforms, and may eventually 
be exported. 
Doran ended with a description of how the US defence 
industry approaches export contracts. In evaluating 
whether to commit resources pursue a contract, US 
defence contractors have to consider such questions as: 
does the country have a genuine requirement for the 
platforms; is funding available; does the country want 
US products; can the defence contractor obtain the 
necessary export licenses; and the appropriateness of co-
production, partnering, or acquiring the domestic defence 
industry? In addition, there are two sales mechanisms for 
exports: direct commercial sales and foreign military sales 
in which the US government purchases from the defence 
contractor, and sells it government-to-government to 
foreign militaries. These mechanisms differ in terms 
of licensing, transfer of technology and knowledge 
issues, and are each suited to different navies. Interested 
customers will need good lawyers to help them navigate 
the complexities of defence contracts.
SubMARINeS: A SPeCIAl CASe?
Cmdre. Jack McCaffrie RAN [Retd]
Jack McCaffrie started by sketching out the various 
submarine programmes and acquisition ambitions 
in Southeast Asia. Indonesia acquired two Type 209 
submarines in 1977 from Germany, and is currently looking 
to purchase two new submarines from either Russia or 
South Korea. Singapore acquired four Challenger-class 
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submarines from 1995, and has recently taken delivery of 
two Archer-class submarines. Because these submarines 
are nearing the end of their service lives (at 40 years and 
25 years old respectively), Singapore is on the lookout for 
replacements. Singapore has also purchased a submarine 
rescue system and conducted a submarine rescue 
exercise. Vietnam purchased two Yugo-class submarines 
in 1997, and has ordered six Kilo-class submarines from 
Russia, while Malaysia entered the game in 2009 with 
two Scorpene-class submarines. The Royal Thai Navy 
may be next, as it seeks to re-establish its previous 
submarine capabilities.
McCaffrie examined the motivations behind the 
submarine programmes, noting that as small navies seek 
to achieve more balanced capabilities, submarines are a 
logical next step. Submarines are particularly useful for 
small navies in deterring potential adversaries as they 
are stealthy and anonymous, increasing their sea denial 
capabilities. They also attract a disproportionate response 
in the development of anti-submarine warfare capabilities. 
The timing of submarines acquisitions could also reflect of 
a change in threat perception regarding the South China 
Sea. Finally, there might be a minor element of envy, as 
regional navies inevitably compare armaments.
McCaffrie spoke about the regional implications of the 
submarine programmes, noting that the submarines are 
mainly European in origin and relatively small in size and 
number, reflecting a focus on defensive local operations, 
although the introduction of the Kilo-class submarines 
would raise the bar. The submarines would add to 
complexity in maritime security, raising the possibility of 
incidents at sea. The regional waters have limited ocean 
areas and several points of geographical significance for 
submarines, necessitating a waterspace management 
regime. Lastly, submarines have potential for cooperation 
in multilateral exercises.
McCaffrie moved onto the implications of the submarine 
programmes for operators, noting that the complexity 
of maintaining the submarines meant that countries 
need to train a sizeable number of skilled technicians. 
Furthermore, it takes around ten years for a crew to gain in 
operational experience, and crew members need to stay 
on longer than that to pass down experience and skills. 
Current submarine numbers were too small for operators 
to maintain general operational capabilities. McCaffrie 
concluded by answering the question posed in the title: 
are submarines a special case? The answer is “yes”, in that 
submarines represent a new capability that demands a 
disproportionate response. On the other hand, the answer 
is also “no”, since they represent a logical and still limited 
addition to naval force structures.
SuRfACe ShIP bAlANCeS: The bAlANCe 
beTweeN fRIgATeS, CORVeTTeS AND  
PATROl bOATS 
Mr. Bob Nugent
Bob Nugent introduced the AMI data set on naval 
portfolios, drawing on 25 years of continuous open-
source research, to forecast Southeast Asian surface ship 
investments over the next 20 years. The forecast defined 
ship types based on standard classifications and ship 
characteristics, noting the increasingly elastic definition 
of frigates, with a displacement range of 2-5,000 tonnes. 
Refits and used-ship purchases were excluded. 
Nugent presented the world naval market forecast of new 
ship purchases, estimating that 3,131 hulls would be built 
at a cost of US$744 billion over the next 20 years. Of this, 
frigates and corvettes would account for 11 per cent of 
volume and 18 per cent of value, while patrol craft and 
OPVs made up 45 per cent of volume and 5.6 per cent 
of value. Over the next 20 years, the Asia-Pacific would 
become the largest naval market in the world by volume 
(28 per cent) and the second largest by value (25 per cent), 
overtaking Europe in both volume and value. The global 
trend towards frigates and OPVs would also prevail in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
Nugent identified three drivers behind the global trend 
towards frigates, corvettes and large OPVs. First, the post-
Cold War shakeout had led navies to adapt force structures 
to new security environments. Legacy navies were cutting 
larger ship programmes in the face of budgetary pressures, 
while transition navies and coast guards moved up the 
capability chain. Second, “low-end” threats to navies had 
emerged since 2000, resulting in market demand for 
ships with anti-submarine warfare capabilities, better 
evasion and soft-kill capabilities. The third driver was the 
adoption of frigates as flagships in countering high-end 
threats anticipated from 2010-20 such as high-speed anti-
ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles and cyber mission 
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killers. This had shaped preferences for small ships with 
increased range, sophisticated radar, SAM capabilities and 
investments in C4ISR.
Nugent summarised the portfolio changes of the 
Southeast Asian navies. Most of them plan to balance 
spending between frigates, OPVs and PVs. No arms race 
appeared evident. The region would be building 145 new 
OPVs/PVs through 2030, at an average rate of seven to 
ten hulls annually. However, spending on frigates would 
be four times the amount devoted to OPVs/PVs. This 
could be prompted by increasing submarine spending. 
Furthermore, many Southeast Asian navies have recently 
completed frigate and OPV programmes, and may be 
shifting spending towards other programmes. The next 
wave of corvette/frigate programmes is expected around 
2025 as the current crop of ships begins to exit service. 
Finally, the naval budget cuts and internal competition in 
Europe and the US may make used/refit ships attractive 
substitutes to new-built vessels in Southeast Asia. 
Nugent concluded by proposing future research directions 
to obtain a fuller picture of the small surface ships 
portfolio. He suggested that refit and used ships be added 
to the database, with the addition of new categories for 
submarines and amphibious ships. Additionally, Southeast 
Asian naval investment patterns could be compared 
and contrasted with peer navies in other regions, or 
against an “optimum” balance determined through a 
tradespace study.
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SESSION VI
NAVAL MODERNISATION AND SOUTHEAST ASIA’S SECURITY
NAVIeS AND COASTguARDS IN SOuTheAST 
ASIA: STRIkINg The bAlANCe
Dr. Sam Bateman
Bateman focused on the role of national coastguards 
in contemporary naval security, with particular focus 
on Southeast Asian maritime security. He highlighted 
the increased complexity of naval warfare, with the 
relationship between maritime law enforcement and 
security forces becoming more legally complex. Bateman 
provided examples of coastguard activities in the 
Southeast Asian region, emphasising the active role of the 
Japanese coastguard in capacity-building initiatives in the 
area, China's use of its civil maritime security forces in the 
recent fishing trawler dispute, and the regional activities 
of the US Coastguard. 
He outlined the reasons for the existence of a separate 
national coastguard fleet, bearing in mind legal and 
constitutional considerations. In his opinion, law 
enforcement agencies tended to misemploy naval 
assets for various purposes, at time, overstretching 
the functions and duties of the navy. The existence of a 
national coastguard would relieve the navy of certain 
law enforcement functions. The coastguard is also less 
sensitive to deploy than naval assets in disputed waters. 
Furthermore, the existence of a separate coastguard 
provides access to sources of funding beyond a country's 
defence budget. Coastguards can access international aid 
money for the purposes of search and rescue operations, 
maritime environmental protection, and helping to secure 
maritime trade. In this manner, the existence of a national 
coastguard need not threaten the navy's budgetary share.
Bateman also elaborated on the roles of the Chinese, 
Japanese and Indian coastguard fleets, with particular 
focus on China's Maritime Surveillance Force (CMSF) that 
operates under the State Oceanographic Administration 
(SOA). CMSF has started to implement its plans to build 
thirty new 4,000-ton vessels over the next five years. These 
would be used to bolster deployments to protect Chinese 
interests in the East and South China Seas.
Bateman outlined an increase in positive trends within 
the Southeast Asian region concerning coastguard 
cooperation. Examples concerned coastguard exercise 
cooperation between South Korea and China in the 
Yellow Sea, India and Japan's anti-piracy cooperation and 
the setting up of the Heads of Asian Coastguard Agencies 
(HACGA). Under the auspices of the HACGA, a coastguard 
exercise conducted towards the end of 2010 involved 
the coastguard fleets of India, Japan, South Korea and 
the Philippines.
Towards his conclusion, Bateman highlighted the 
changing and enmeshing roles between the navy and 
the coastguard – the coastguard potentially provides 
support for navies in the military role, whereas navies 
are supporting the coastguard in policing and law 
enforcement. Meanwhile coastguards are assuming a 
more prominent role in diplomacy and support of foreign 
policy. Bateman concluded his talk by questioning the 
nature of power shared between the coastguards and the 
navy: does the coastguard employ a form of soft power, 
and is the navy's exercise of power a form of hard power? 
Recent trends regarding the increase in prominence of the 
role of national coastguards suggest this shift in maritime 
strategic thinking, with coastguards eventually paving the 
way to stronger regional maritime cooperation, through 
preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures. 
ARMS RACeS OR ARMS DyNAMICS
Dr. Bernard Loo
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Bernard Loo's talk focused on the theoretical foundation 
of arms racing and naval modernisation in the Southeast 
Asian region. He began by defining the concept of arms 
racing as manifested through an extraordinary and 
consistent increase in defence spending. He juxtaposed 
the concepts of arms dynamic and arms racing, with 
the former being defined as the process by which states 
acquire and maintain their armed forces, which is seen 
as a legitimate implementation of national security 
goals, as opposed to the latter where two or more states 
fear mutual threat, and therefore increase their military 
arsenals in a manner of passive aggression. 
Bernard Loo presented data with a long-run view of naval 
modernisation in the Southeast Asian region. The data 
showed an increase in the number of frigates, corvettes 
and air weapons system acquisition in the four decades 
from 1970 to 2009, for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
In noting the trend towards increased acquisition, Bernard 
Loo explained the drivers of naval modernisation in the 
Southeast Asian region. There are military-strategic drivers 
such as the increasing salience of the maritime domain, 
particularly owing to the growing concerns related to 
piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents, the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) emphasis on joint warfare 
doctrines, and the emergence of new strategic challenges 
for Southeast Asian countries. The non-strategic drivers 
to naval modernisation that include national prestige 
and showcase, supply-side pressures that arise from 
the availability of relatively cheap platforms and 
weapons systems. 
In his conclusion, Loo analysed the potential for arms 
racing in the Southeast Asian region, stating that much 
depends on how the phenomenon is defined. Bernard 
Loo is of the opinion that there is limited evidence for an 
arms race in the region, despite a general and consistent 
increase in defence spending and acquisitions. There is 
also little evidence of an action-reaction phenomenon 
between the countries in the sub-region. Owing to 
the absence of a sudden increase in defence-related 
expenditure, or defence purchases amongst the countries 
in the region, naval modernisation in Southeast Asia can 
be characterised as an arms dynamic, as opposed to arms 
racing, that carries security implications not only for the 
sub-region, but for the Asia-Pacific.
ChAlleNgeS AND OPPORTuNITIeS Of 
COMMON SeCuRITy IN The MARITIMe 
eNVIRONMeNT
Dr. Stanley Weeks
Stanley Weeks' talk provided an optimistic overview of 
the areas of maritime cooperation in the Southeast Asian 
region, with an emphasis on the role of the US Navy and 
coastguard to enhance the security of the Asia-Pacific 
maritime environment. He distinguished between two 
types of maritime coalitions: national navies that are used 
for defence and national security purposes, and collective 
navies that are used for tackling non-traditional maritime 
threats like piracy and human trafficking. 
A key imperative of maritime security, according to Weeks, 
is international naval partnership, as the issue of maritime 
security has increasingly become an international 
problem that requires joint cooperative solutions. The 
overall goal is the safeguarding of the maritime commons. 
This requires an increase in maritime domain awareness.
Weeks went on to explain the situation of maritime 
security in the four sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific: 
Northeast and Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and 
South Pacific. Northeast Asia, according to Weeks, is still 
influenced by traditional big power maritime disputes. 
Southeast Asia faces sub-regional problems like territorial 
disputes, terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and 
other serious non-traditional security threats. But with 
organisations like ASEAN and the ARF, the region looks 
to build on existing coalitions for joint solutions. Noting 
America's role in the region, Weeks called for sensitivity to 
sovereignty concerns for Southeast Asian countries. The 
sub-region of the Indian Ocean will witness an intense 
increase in Sino-Indian maritime competition in the 
coming decades. The South Pacific sub-region presents 
the most optimistic case where the US must “follow, not 
lead”. With the strengthening of the ANZUS alliance, 
maritime cooperation appears promising in Oceania. 
In conclusion, Weeks pointed to areas of partnership 
development, particularly the development of maritime 
operational relationship between the US and China, and 
stronger maritime cooperation between the US and India.
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CONCLUDINg REMARkS
Professor Till and Mr Kwa Chong Guan, RSIS Head of 
External Programmes, summarised the key points 
discussed over the two days of the conference. It had 
emerged that countries in Southeast Asia have differing 
threat perceptions which lead naturally to different naval 
acquisition practices in terms of types and numbers of 
weapons, operational and deployment patterns. The 
varying domestic and external challenges at the national 
level also have a significant impact on the modernisation 
process. When considering Southeast Asia as a whole 
there were also common factors driving the naval 
modernisation process: the need to defend territorial 
integrity and provide offshore stability; to ensure the 
protection of SLOC and seaborne trade; the capacity to 
respond to emerging non-traditional security threats and 
a willingness to contribute to HADR. 
There is a general correlation between economic growth 
and the pursuit of military advancement. Given that 
Southeast Asia has made great achievements in economic 
growth over the last decade, it is hardly surprising that 
there has been such remarkable growth in the size, 
composition and operational aspirations of naval fleets. 
Whether there is a naval arm race or naval dynamic in 
this region much depends on how the phenomenon 
of naval modernisation is defined. It might be too soon 
to determine the nature of naval modernisation, or 
enhancement, in Southeast Asia, and its impact on the 
wider region. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate its 
extent in Southeast Asia, or forget that it trails Northeast 
Asia significantly in scale.
Looking to the future, there are both challenges and 
opportunities for naval cooperation in the Southeast 
Asia. The overall goal for naval partnership is to safeguard 
the maritime commons and to increase awareness in 
the maritime domain. One area for future development 
concerns the buildup of coast guard forces in the region. 
This has potential to release navies from some of their 
constabulary functions to concentrate on more traditional 
defence roles.
The conference had also set out to answer whether naval 
modernisation or enhancement in Southeast Asia would 
create problems or provide security for the region. The 
final session prompted the encouraging conclusion that 
there was no naval arms race in this region, although a 
reactive dynamic was observable in some cases. The 
spectrum of both competitive and cooperative navies 
in nature should be balanced. It was suggested that 
navies could be used as a platform for improving regional 
cooperation and developing further the concept of 
partnership. The knowledge and ideas produced by the 
conference would be fed into other forums in the region 
including the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP). The full conference proceedings are to be 
published as an edited volume.
Mr. Kwa Chong Guan
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The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) 
was officially inaugurated on 1 January 2007. Before that, 
it was known as the Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 
30 July 1996. Like its predecessor, RSIS was established as 
an autonomous entity within the Nanyang Technological 
University (NTU).
The School exists to develop a community of scholars 
and policy analysts at the forefront of Asia-Pacific security 
studies and international affairs. Its three core functions 
are research, graduate teaching and networking activities 
in the Asia-Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security 
related research in Asia-Pacific Security, Conflict and Non-
Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and 
Country and Area Studies.
The School‘s activities are aimed at assisting policymakers 
to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking 
on issues related to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
and their implications for Singapore.
For more information about RSIS, please visit http://www.
rsis.edu.sg/.
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